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I. The Unauthorized Fees Collected by the City are Subject to a Takings Claim. 
In its response briet~ the Respondent/Defendant City of Pocatello (City) makes a new and 
somewhat misieading argument that was not raised before the district court, i.e. that because the 
City was "authorized" to impose a water and sewer fee there is no Takings claim for 
"umeasonable" fees. (See Response Brief pp. 8-12.) This Court has consistently held that issues 
raised for the first time on appeal should not be considered. Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 138 Idaho 
309, 314, 63 P.3d 435,440 (2003). Regardless, this particular argument flies in the face of the 
uncontested rulings in this case and completely misapplies this Court's relevant holdings in both 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004) and the earlier case 
of BHA Investments, Inc. v. State of Idaho, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.3d 474 (2003). 1 
In this case, the question posed by Plaintiff/ Appellants is not nor has it ever been whether 
the City has a right to impose water and user fees and that the fees do not "bear a reasonable 
relationship to the services provided." That is a complete mis-characterization of 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims by the City. In truth, the claim by Plaintiffs/Appellants has always 
been whether the City has imposed and used fees collected under the guise of water and sewer for 
unauthorized or illegal purposes in which case such monies are considered improperly taken 
property subject to a Takings claim. 
1 Note that the City did not cite BHA Investments v. State of Idaho anywhere in its briefs 
or arguments below (See R. Vol. I pp. 580-93, 304-324.) Its citation to BHA Investments, Inc. v 
City of Boise is referenced on with regard to the issue of retroactivity. Id. p. 318. 
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was 
was not an "unreasonable fee" but rather an unauthorized fee: 
Since the PILOT fees are or have been transferred from revenue collected from "rates, 
fees, and charges" of the water and sewer system, i.e. connection and user fees, and are 
not used for a regulatory purpose nor for purposes allowed by the Idaho Revenue Bond 
Act, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible 
taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees or both all of which is contrary to 
Idaho statutory and case law ... [I]t is the Court's determination that any fee which 
includes a PILOT component is umeasonable, arbitrary and contrary to statute. 
R. Vol I, p. 357. 
Idaho law clearly provides that the exacting of fees constitutes "a taking of property under 
the United States and Idaho Constitutions." BHA Invest., Inc. v. City of Boise, 108 P.3d 315,319, 
(Idaho 2004). There is literally no reason to look to other jurisdictions, including federal courts, 
for an answer to the question whether the Takings Clause protects fees such as the ones involved 
in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that the Takings Clause applies to 
situations such as the present case. 
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. Boise, the Court held, "Money is clearly property that may 
not be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation. Brown v. Legal Found. of 
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003)." Id. at 319. The Court continued: 
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. State we quoted from San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 27 Cal.4th 643, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87, 106 (2002), 
as follows: "To put the matter simply, the taking of money is different, under the Fifth 
Amendment, from the taking of real or personal property. The imposition of various 
monetary exactions-taxes, special assessments, and user fees-has been accorded 
substantial judicial deference." Although we acknowledged that the taking of money by a 
governmental entity in connection with the granting of a privilege is viewed differently 
from the taking of real or personal property, in that the taking of money in that 
circumstance has been accorded greater judicial deference, we did not hold that money 
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Id. 
Constitutions. 
This Court also further noted that: 
We have also held that a city's imposition of a purported fee that does not bear a 
reasonable relationship to services to be provided by the city is in reality the imposition of 
a tax. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). We have not 
held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it has no authority to impose at all, 
such fee must be paid under protest before it can be recovered .... The purpose of the 
analysis regarding excessive fees is to prevent a city from imposing an illegal tax by 
masquerading it as a fee. That analysis does not apply, however, where the city does not 
have the authority to impose either the tax or the fee. If it has no authority to impose any 
fee at all, it does not matter whether the fee imposed bears a reasonable relationship to the 
services provided. It is illegal regardless of the amount of the fee. 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. Boise 108 P.3d at 323. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly spoken on the issue of whether 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants may recover against municipalities or govermnental agencies for illegal 
fees/disguised taxes. The Court has held that Plaintiffs have a right to recover under the Takings 
Clause of both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The mechanism for such a recovery is 
a Section 1983 cause of action. Id 
As in BHA Investments v. Boise, in this case the City's imposition of an "unauthorized" 
PILOT constitutes a illegal fee/disguised tax that is subject to a Takings claim. The facts in this 
case simply do not apply to this Court's holding in the prior BHA Investments, Inc. v. State of 
Idaho, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.3d 474 (2003), wherein the Court held that a "liquor license fee" was 
an authorized fee under the state's regulatory or police power, therefore giving the state 
substantial latitude on the amount of the fee. Id. 138 Idaho at 353, 63 P.3d at 479. 
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BHA Investments, Inc. v. Boise substantially distinguished and limited the application of its prior 
decision in BHA Investments, Inc. v. State of Idaho: 
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. Staie, we stated, ''The primary argument ofBHA is that the 
money in excess of a reasonable transfer fee is a taking." 138 Idaho at 355, 63 P.3d at 
481. BHA contended that the amount of the fee must bear a reasonable relationship to the 
value of the services rendered and any excess charged over such amount constituted an 
unconstitutional taking of property. We noted that a liquor license fee, including the 
transfer fee at issue, was imposed by the State pursuant to its police power. As such, we 
stated, "Liquor license fees may be imposed to such a degree that the amount effectively 
discourages entrance in the business. The funds for a transfer fee need not relate 
specifically to the amount needed to investigate the transfer." 138 Idaho at 353, 63 P.3d at 
479 (internal citations omitted). We held that because of the latitude given the State under 
its police power to impose fees for liquor licenses, the transfer fee at issue was not an 
unconstitutional taking of property. As we stated, "Deference is given to the State in its 
use of the police power in this case regarding the transfer fee. There is no unconstitutional 
taking under either the Idaho or United States Constitution." 138 Idaho at 355, 63 P.3d at 
481. Our holding in BHA Investments, Inc. v. State has no application to this case 
because the City does not have the power to charge a fee for transferring a liquor 
license. 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004) (emphasis 
added). 
Thus in this case, as is already settled law, the City had no authority to charge a PILOT or 
any other unauthorized fee under the guise of a water and user fee. As such, such fees that were 
improperly imposed are recoverable under a Takings claim. This Court's holding in BHA 
Investments v. State is inapplicable because, again, Plaintiffs/ Appellants are not claiming an 
"umeasonable" use of fees collected under proper police authority, but rather an unauthorized 
fee. As such Plaintiffs/Appellants' appeal should be granted. 
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then Attempting to Hide its Knowledge. 
In its response to whether it could be liable under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, the 
City appears to concede that there are at least factual issues over whether the City's conduct 
was "reckless, willful and wanton," and instead suggests that there is no disputed facts over 
whether the City acted with "malice." (Response Brief pp. 16-19). Oddly, the City also relies 
upon this Court's ruling in Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 187; 731 P.2d 171, 182 
(1986), but omitting the actual definition of"malice:" 
We conclude and hold that malice here means "actual" malice, which we define as the 
intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or 
excuse and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended. Id. 
112 Idaho at 188, 731 P.2d at 182. 
Instead the City seems to errantly suggest that there needs to be a "criminal intent. (Response 
Brief p. 17.) 
Even under the standard set forth in Anderson, there is at least a factual dispute over 
whether the City acted with malice including "ill will." Again, it was the City itself who sought 
the legal opinion of the State Attorney General (AG Opinion) who informed the City not once, 
but twice, that the PILOT was an illegal fee. (See again R. App. Supp., pp. 27-43.) In other 
words, this was not independent or unsolicited counsel provided to the City. Rather, the City 
obtained a legal opinion, and yet knowingly proceeded with the imposition of the illegal fee. 
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an extreme 
Plaintif£1Appellant's representative Logan Robinson who is specifically referenced in the City's 
letter to the Attorney General. Id. This kind of conduct in itself suggests "ill will." 
Moreover, the fact that the AG Opinion was an "advisory" opinion and not "binding" 
matters not in this analysis. The fact remains that the City sought but then acted against the 
advice of legal counsel. It had a full knowledge and awareness that the PILOT would likely be 
an illegal fee, including the specific legal reasons why, yet chose to move forward anyway. 
Additionally, regardless of whether the evidence of spoliation or concealment of the AG 
Opinion was pointed out in response to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the 
Appellant/Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, the district court's decision to disregard this 
relevant evidence in deciding summary judgment was an error. (See R. App. Supp., pp. 20-22, 
76-90, 105-109, 111-112.) Again, if in fact the City took illegal action, i.e. in destroying or 
concealing documents to cover-up what it knew, that also constitutes material facts as to 
whether the City acted with malice, including ill will. This is a question that should go to the 
jury and also makes the City potentially liable for its conduct under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
HI. Because the Decision in the Building Contractors Case in No Way "Overruled" 
Prior Law, a Prospective Application Analysis is not Warranted or Appropriate. 
The City clearly does not understand the legal concepts behind the rare analysis of when 
a rule established in a judicial decision should only be "prospectively" applied which was 
discussed in detail in Plaintiffs/Appellants' brief. (See Appellants' Brief pp. 24-26.) Again, 
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whether there are circumstances that justify an "overruling" holding or "new law" be applied 
only prospectively. Id However, as completely missed by the City in its response, before a 
Court can even address such a question, a critical component that must be present is an actual 
"overruling" decision, or a "new rule" replacing a "prevailing rule." See again Jones v. 
Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 608- 609, 570 P.2d. 284, 287-88 (1977). 
As such, in considering the proper analysis, the decision of the district court to 
only prospectively apply the Building Contractors Case is misguided if not absurd. Again, the 
holdings of the Building Contractors Case did not overrule or replace any existing law or 
precedent set either by the Idaho Supreme Court or even the district court, but in fact relied 
upon existing precedent here in Idaho. 
In other words, the PILOT was no less legal prior to the Building Contractors decision 
than after. All the district court did in its decision in the Building Contractors Case was to 
identify the existing rules of law as established by this Supreme Court and by the Idaho 
Legislature to hold that the City was violating the law when it implemented the PILOT. It is 
strange that the district court would be able to somehow absolve the City from liability on 
existing law and precedent set by his Court just because no one had yet sued the City to 
determine whether it was following such laws. Indeed, under such a flawed analysis, it would 
be difficult if not impossible to hold any defendant accountable for violations of the rule of law. 
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The Appellants/Plaintiffs' 4t.'1 Issue presented on appeal is whether the district court 
errantly dismissed their claims for damages and equitable relief pertaining to the 
Connection/Capacity Fees. (Appellants Brief p. 4.) The appellant brief dedicates more than five 
pages to this issue. (pp. 30-35, Section V.) However, the City does not provide a single 
argument or point in opposition to these arguments. 
In essence, the Plaintiffs/Appellants set forth facts and law suggesting that virtually 
every Connection/Capacity Fee dollar collected from 2007-2015 was improperly used for the 
PILOT and/or bond retirement. (Id. pp. 33-35.) Not only should this make these fees improper 
charges that are subject to recovery under a Takings claim, but it also raises questions as to the 
methods used to calculate the fees. (Id. pp. 34-35.) This justifies equitable reliefrequested in 
the complaint as well as a recovery of the fees. 
In that this key issue has not been refuted, Plaintiffs/Appellants' appeal should be 
granted and remanded back to the district court for a determination of whether damages and 
equitable relief is warranted with regard to how the City has conducted its Connection/Capacity 
Fee policies in particular since the completion of the Building Contractors Case and even after 
the complaint in this case was filed. 
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that the City has failed to adequately refute or respond to the issues and arguments raised 
by the Plaintiffs/ Appellants in their appeal, this Court should grant the appeal, vacating the district 
coUt'i:'s granting of SUt11n1ary judgment and allow Plaintiffa/ Appellants to t1y their case. 
DATED this 16th day of December, 2016. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 16th day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 20 and 34.1 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste.150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
E,r.,tAIL: bgh@hasattornevs.com 
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Method of Service: 
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Nathan M. Olsen 
